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T H E  E N G AG E M E N T  C U RV E
Populism and Political Engagement in Latin America
Rafael Piñeiro
Universidad Católica de Uruguay
Matthew Rhodes-Purdy
Boise State University
Fernando Rosenblatt
Universidad de Diego Portales, Chile
Abstract: Considerable research has been conducted on the relationship between socio-
economic inequality and political engagement. However, there is little consensus on the 
exact nature of the relationship, and considerable variation in the relationship exists 
even among countries with similar levels of inequality. This lack of clarity in the litera-
ture exists because the impact of inequality on engagement is not constant, but changes 
depending on the strategic choices of political leaders. Populist leaders, who tend to 
explicitly connect political and socioeconomic exclusion, can activate latent grievances 
around inequality. Using data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project, we 
show that inequality leads to disengagement among the poor in most contexts but in-
creases engagement under populist rule. In other words, a primarily structural rela-
tionship is mediated by political variables. Even though the severity of inequality is 
outside the control of any political actor, leaders’ reaction to inequality can dramatically 
alter its impact on mass political behavior.
Given that structural inequality is consistently high across Latin America, 
why do the poor show more political engagement in some polities than in others? 
Many theories have addressed this relationship, but these studies tend to have 
variables associated with economic development as their primary causal factors, 
treating political variables as secondary. For example, Solt (2008) found a direct 
negative effect of inequality on political engagement in wealthy democracies. 
Within the democratization literature there have been several studies (e.g., Boix 
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2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Rueschemeyer 2004) that have modeled more 
contingent relations between inequality and attitudes, but such approaches are 
extremely limited in their ability to explain different outcomes among countries 
with similar levels of inequality. In some sense, these limitations are built into 
the design of so-called structural theories, which envision macro-level, relatively 
static factors (e.g., inequality, ethnic diversity) as the most important predictors of 
political phenomena. Even those works inspired by rational choice see “choice” as 
the relatively automatic response of individuals to exogenous incentives and con-
straints; they do not envision choice as involving any real agency or contingency 
at the individual level, beyond random deviation from structurally determined 
behavioral patterns. Thus, in both structural and rational-choice studies, politics 
is more an effect than a cause.
These works all share a missing link between inequality and political attitudes: 
politics. They do not problematize the way that distributive confl ict translates 
into the political arena; the assumption of a constant, direct relationship between 
structural conditions and mass political attitudes simply cannot account for the 
array of reactions to inequality that can be observed in Latin America. In this 
article, we argue that certain political “menus”—that is, leaders who make certain 
types of appeals and use specifi c political strategies—can alter the way national-
level inequality affects the political attitudes of the poor, in turn reshaping the 
usual relationship between inequality and political engagement. More specifi -
cally, we claim that political agents can boost the political engagement of the poor 
by deliberately politicizing distributive confl ict.
Our goal is to fully account for the combined effect of economic structure and 
political leadership agency on citizens’ attitudes and behavior toward the politi-
cal arena. Structural inequality creates deep social divisions that confl ict with the 
democratic ideal of political equality. The poor lack the resources to transfer their 
interests to politics, which generates apathy and negates the egalitarian effect of 
democratic politics. Thus, inequality creates a potential for political confl ict, but 
that confl ict remains latent in many contexts because of the inability to solve col-
lective action dilemmas and bear the costs of political action.
Political leaders who combine a combative political strategy with strong re-
distributive rhetoric can trigger latent confl ict. Hence, citizens’ attitudes toward 
politics change from apathy to engagement. In other words, the relationship be-
tween inequality and political engagement is not really a line but a curve; the 
basic structure of this curve is set by structural relations at the national level, but 
its specifi c shape in any given society can vary a great deal depending on how 
political leaders choose to react to it.
INEQUALITY AND ENGAGEMENT IN POLITICS: 
COLLECTIVE ACTION COSTS AS THE MISSING LINK
Before proceeding with the theoretical framework, we need to specify what 
we mean by inequality. Inequality is a multilevel concept, composed of severity of 
inequality at the national level and socioeconomic status (SES) at the individual 
level. Inequality is endemic in Latin America, and thus there is little variation 
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at the national level, with a few notable exceptions, such as Uruguay. Hence, we 
mostly analyze its effect at the individual level, although we do include national-
level inequality as a control variable in our statistical analyses.
The effect of inequality on politics has increasingly gained scholarly attention. 
Solt (2008) conducted an empirical analysis specifi cally on the effect of inequality 
on political attitudes, in which he effi ciently organized existing theoretical ap-
proaches to the topic into three distinct groups. First, he identifi es the theory of 
relative power. This approach assumes that there is a linear relationship between 
economic power and political power. Possession of resources translates into mar-
ginalization of those who have fewer resources. Consequently, it is assumed that 
the poor will be alienated and will show greater apathy toward politics because 
their interests are not politicized (Goodin and Dryzek 1980). This also generates 
low involvement of the rich, since they do not feel their interests are threatened 
(Solt 2008). In short, high national inequality will have a negative impact on en-
gagement, whereas socioeconomic status will have no impact, with the wealthy 
and poor equally disengaged in high-inequality societies.
The second approach introduced by Solt (2008) emphasizes confl ict. As op-
posed to the previous perspective, greater distributive confl ict leads to greater in-
terest in politics (Meltzer and Richards 1981; Brady 2004). In Solt’s (2008, 49) words: 
“Higher levels of inequality cause divergences in political preferences that fuel 
debates about the appropriate course of policy; these debates then cause higher 
rates of political mobilization.” He also claims that polarization between the rich 
and the poor increases with inequality. In this perspective we could include Boix 
(2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2006) works, as their models assume that 
the distributive confl ict automatically translates into the political realm. This ap-
proach predicts increased engagement in high-inequality societies but also that 
SES will have no impact within countries; the intense confl ict engendered by in-
equality should equally galvanize the rich and poor.
A third approach is resource theory. This theory holds that political participa-
tion has a cost, and involvement is a function of individuals’ resources, that is, 
their capacity to pay the cost of participating depends on relative income (Anso-
labehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003). Consequently, those who have enough 
resources (the rich) to pay that cost will have greater involvement than those who 
do not (the poor) (Solt 2008, 49–50). This approach shares with relative power the-
ory the prediction of a negative relationship between national-level inequality 
and political engagement, but it further predicts that socioeconomic status will 
have a positive relationship with engagement. That is, high inequality will gener-
ally depress engagement, but this depression will be especially acute among poor 
citizens and much less severe among the wealthy.
Solt (2008) tests these three different approaches in upper-middle-income de-
mocracies. He concludes that results are consistent only with the relative power 
theory. In a nutshell, lower income quintiles have less political involvement; when 
inequality is extremely high, the poor are so marginalized that the wealthy cease 
to participate as well, secure in their social position. In Solt’s (2008, 58) own words: 
“Declining political interest, discussion of politics, and participation in elections 
among poorer citizens with rising inequality attest to the increased ability of rela-
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tively wealthy individuals to make politics meaningless for those with lower in-
comes in such circumstances.”
What is the problem with these approaches? They do not allow political lead-
ers to try different tactics or strategies when faced with the same circumstances. 
All of these approaches assume a consistent linear relationship between inequal-
ity and political engagement. They all assume that the poor must bear the en-
tire cost of participation. This assumption rules out the possibility that political 
agents or leaders may have much to gain by paying costs or offering solutions to 
collective action problems. When the effect of different political strategies is taken 
into account, the relationship between inequality (in both its dimensions) and 
engagement becomes highly dependent on political context. Inequality and one’s 
position in the income distribution matter, but their impact is shaped by the kind 
of political options available. More specifi cally, in the context of contemporary 
Latin America, that impact is mediated by the existence of leaders who activate 
the distributive confl ict.
We are not the fi rst to argue that political variables create varying outcomes 
in response to constant structural conditions. For example, Roberts (2002) exam-
ined how such dynamics affect parties and party systems. Several scholars have 
explained variation in policy outcomes despite similar levels of inequality by 
introducing political variables. Some have related the political determinants of 
inequality to redistribution regimes (Huber et al. 2006; Huber, Mustillo, and Ste-
phens 2008; Pribble, Huber, and Stephens 2009; Huber and Stephens 2010; Pribble 
2011). It is generally agreed that the poor have signifi cantly more severe collective 
action problems than do those in higher social strata (Houle 2009). The poor’s 
only advantage lies in their number, which is really no advantage at all because 
coordination has been historically elusive. This is why those who study democ-
ratization have paid signifi cant attention to collective action problems of the poor 
(Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992).
These arguments share a common feature. For political outcomes where the 
behavior of the poor is potentially decisive, the crucial variable is whether and 
how the poor’s collective action dilemma is solved. However, none of these works 
explicitly includes theories of how these dilemmas get solved, and how different 
types of solutions may lead to different outcomes within similar structural con-
texts. They are taken as exogenous explanatory variables rather than dependent 
variables needing explanation of their own.
Under democracy political leaders are necessary, even essential, for precisely 
this reason: acting in pursuit of their own interests, they provide solutions to 
collective action dilemmas for those who cannot provide for themselves. How-
ever, there is no guarantee in any given context that leaders will appear to take 
advantage of latent redistributive confl ict. As the vast literature on party-citizen 
linkages suggests, representation of the poor’s redistributive interests cannot be 
taken for granted (Kitschelt 2000; Piattoni 2001; Stokes 2005; Kitschelt and Wilkin-
son 2007; Kitschelt et al. 2010; Luna 2014). The highly contingent nature of this 
interaction between economic structure and political strategy can produce a wide 
range of outcomes even in similar contexts.
Before discussing the types of strategies that might be best suited for solving 
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the collective action dilemmas we have described, we need to briefl y clarify our 
argument. Our argument is not centered on policy outcomes; we have nothing 
to say about why countries choose different tactics for dealing with inequality, 
or about why some are more successful than others in this regard. Instead of ex-
plaining different levels of inequality or social spending, the conventional ap-
proach to structural inequality in the Latin American literature, we try to assess 
how political strategy interacts with inequality to produce the variation in pat-
terns of engagement that we observe.
TYPES OF POLITICAL STRATEGIES
Now that we have established the potential importance of political strategies 
in our argument, an obvious question arises: what sort of strategy is most likely 
to solve the collective action dilemmas of the poor? Given that our theory involves 
political strategy, it makes sense to turn to a movement and leaders defi ned by 
political strategy: populists. Defi ning populism is a contentious issue in political 
science. However, there seems to be considerable support for several key features. 
Weyland (2001) argued convincingly that, whatever the specifi c defi nition, popu-
lism is an explicitly political strategy. The defi nition used here conforms to that 
insight: we defi ne populism as a political strategy characterized by two features. 
The fi rst is the assumption that social problems can and should be solved through 
the political arena. The second is the embrace of an extremely combative politi-
cal style, in which confl ict and open confrontation with one’s political adversar-
ies is considered necessary and desirable.1 This defi nition is very similar to that 
employed by Hawkins (2010), who emphasizes a Manichaean discourse pitting 
the populist movement against all others. It is also similar to the defi nition of the 
“contestatory left” as defi ned by Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter (2010), although 
the defi nition used here is not confi ned to the political left.
The relevance of populism to the theory here is fairly straightforward. Popu-
lists “feel the urge to contest with political enemies” in order to “strengthen the 
loyalty of mass followers” (Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010, 3). Populist lead-
ers often preside over fractious, poorly institutionalized mass movements, and 
thus have strong incentives to encourage political action among their followers as 
a mechanism for maintaining unity and movement cohesion. For those populists 
whose ideology places them among the political left, the attraction of activating 
latent disaffection over inequality in order to cement their links to their base is 
clear.
There is a fundamental divide between leaders and movements that could be 
placed on the left of the Latin American ideological spectrum. In their book on 
leftist governments in Latin America, Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter (2010) em-
phasize the division between reformist leftists and more radical leftist leaders 
who, in the modern era, have been populist as opposed to socialist or communist 
parties. The reformist left accepts the current rules of the game (political institu-
1. This defi nition helps clarify a diffi cult case: that of Uruguay. The Frente Amplio certainly meets 
the fi rst criteria but not the second.
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tions) as given and legitimate, and it seeks to work under those rules to reduce 
poverty and the negative social effects of inequality through sound policy and a 
nonconfrontational relationship with the elite. The populist left, however, views 
inequality, both social and political, as a root cause of social ills and has a confron-
tational orientation to it and its social manifestations. To the reformist, everyone 
can eventually win; to the populist, the poor can gain only what the rich lose; this 
Manichaean view of political competition is, in fact, a defi ning characteristic of 
populism to many (Hawkins 2010). The zero-sum nature of social competition en-
visioned by populist leaders naturally leads to a strong emphasis on contention. 
This also explains why we choose to accept standard categorizations of the left 
that lump the highly mobilized Frente Amplio in Uruguay, for example, with elit-
ist leftist parties. In the absence of anti-elite vitriol and the emphasis on a concilia-
tory approach to dealing with social inequality, we have little reason to expect a 
dramatic reshaping of the engagement curve (although the intercept of the curve 
might well be higher in countries with a mobilized but noncontestatory left).
Left-wing populists, perhaps more than any other type of leader, stress the in-
terconnections between political and economic marginalization and the potential 
to overcome the latter by ending the former. Even though traditional leftist parties 
could hypothetically fulfi ll the causal role we ascribe to populist leaders, nothing 
ensures that such parties will actually seek to mobilize the poor. In fact, in the 
context of institutionalized party systems the electoral success of such parties can 
be partly explained by the moderation of their redistributive claims (Hunter 2010; 
Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010; Levitsky and Roberts 2011).2 This argument 
complements Roberts’s (2002) claim that traditional political parties in Latin Amer-
ica have, for a variety of reasons, failed to activate latent concerns over inequality. 
In some sense our argument poses a caveat to his claim: while parties have not 
taken advantage of this opportunity, personalistic leaders, particularly those who 
come from outside the traditional elite, have seized the opportunity to fi ll the void. 
Furthermore, the presence of electorally viable populist alternatives with strong 
redistributive claims is likely to translate economic interests into politics.
To summarize, leaders who favor redistribution should not be expected to 
produce any change in the relationship between SES and political engagement 
as posited by resource theory. However, the combination of a combative politi-
cal strategy and leftist ideology creates a strong incentive for left-wing populists 
to offer organizational and rhetorical support to the poor, thus allowing them 
to overcome collective action dilemmas and the prohibitive costs of political ac-
tion. In essence, we propose a two-dimensional schema (see table 1) for political 
leaders that is based on both their policy appeals (redistribution or not) and their 
political strategy (emphasis on mobilization against the elite, or emphasis on ne-
2. Luna, Bidegain, and Reserve (2011, 1) introduce a novel account on the impact of “neo-socialist 
mobilization” on citizens’ values: “Cases undergoing ‘neo-socialist’ mobilization seem to have gained at 
least some programmatic structure. This took place on the midst of unfavorable historical and structural 
conditions. . . .  [P]olarizing political processes can lead to RPG [responsible party government] espe-
cially when bottom-up organizing and collective action match leaders’ mobilization attempts. Moreover, 
RPG emerges more often as a result of leftist-driven polarization, which also has to be sustained over a 
given signifi cantly long period of time.” Their work inspires our endeavor and both are intertwined.
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gotiation and compromise with the elite). We argue that both these elements are 
necessary to reshape the engagement curve.
This is not a minor question: if moderate leftists have the same effect on the re-
lationship between inequality and political engagement that populists do, it would 
indicate that poverty reduction policies alone are suffi cient to trigger a reduction 
in the slope of the engagement curve. This allows for a test not only of the theory 
proposed here but also of its causal mechanism. If redistribution alone were suf-
fi cient to moderate the relationship between SES and engagement, it would sug-
gest that policy content was the primary mechanism. However, if moderate leftists 
and populists do not have the same impact on this relationship, it would provide 
strong evidence for our argument that explicitly political factors play an important 
role on leveling the engagement curve between the poor and the rich.
Before we proceed to our empirical analysis, we believe it is necessary to clearly 
state what we do not mean with our argument as it relates to political strategy. 
Much has been written in the past few years regarding the pernicious effects of 
populism on democracy. The wave of populist regimes in Latin America has gen-
erated interesting scholarly work analyzing the impact of these types of regimes 
(e.g., Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010). Our argument does not necessarily con-
tradict their fi ndings. Neither normative nor theoretical implications of the effect 
these governments have on democratic stability, democratic quality, or the relative 
health of competitive politics will be derived from our analysis here, except for 
brief speculation in the conclusion. We do highlight how, under some scenarios 
in which inequality is rampant and unaddressed by the political system, populist 
governments can positively affect citizens’ political engagement. Second, it is not 
our purpose to identify the historical conditions that determine the emergence of 
populist leaders who favor a strong redistributive rhetoric. As mentioned before, 
populism has arisen at various periods throughout Latin America, and it does 
not appear to be predicted by national-level inequality in the region. In fact, the 
appearance of successful populists is more likely predicted by political context 
than by economic variables (Rhodes-Purdy 2015). Therefore we feel confi dent that 
populism’s presence or absence can be safely treated as exogenous for the pur-
poses of our analyses. We take no position on the causal antecedents of populism; 
we simply show how political strategies interact with distributive realities.
Table 1 Political strategies and the effects on levels of engagement 
Political strategy
Anti-elite 
mobilization
No anti-elite 
mobilizationa
Redistributive claims Populists Moderate leftists
No redistributive claims Rightist populistsb Center and right
a This category includes both demobilized parties (e.g., those of the Concertación in Chile) and mo-
bilized leftist parties that nevertheless take a largely conciliatory tone toward the wealthy and their 
political representatives (e.g., Frente Amplio in Uruguay or the Brazilian Partido dos Trabalhadores).
b In our time frame this cell is empty, but historically it might include fi gures such as Carlos Saúl 
 Menem (Argentina) and Alberto Fujimori (Peru) (Weyland 2002).
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EXPLAINING INTEREST AND INVOLVEMENT IN UNEQUAL SOCIETIES
Model Specifi cation and Hypotheses
The most important relationship for our theory is political engagement, re-
gressed on SES:
(1) YPolitical Engagementi = β 0 + β 1XSESi + ui .
Because our observations are nested within country-years, we specify a multi-
level model:
(2) YPolitical Engagementi = β 0K + β 1KXSES i + u i ;
(3) β 0 K = γ0 0 + r0 k ,
where γ00 is the between-country-year intercept, and r0 k is a random disturbance 
term for the kth country. Substituting equation 3 into equation 2 leads to the 
following:
(4) YPolitical Engagementi = γ00 + β 1XSESi + r0 k + u i .
This type of model, often called a fi xed-effects model, is mathematically equiva-
lent to adding a dummy variable for each country year to an ordinary regression 
model. The addition of level 2 predictors (which we specify shortly) requires the 
specifi cation presented here.
Our theory suggests that β 1 is not constant but varies depending on the pres-
ence or absence of populist leadership. This leads to the following equation:
(5) YPolitical Engagement i = β g 0 + βg 1XSES i + u i ,
where g is the subscript for each group (either populists and nonpopulists in the 
two-group analysis, or populists, moderate leftists, and others in the three-group 
analysis). Our theory suggests a set of hypotheses:
H1 0 : β 1 ( populist ) = β 1(nonpopulist)
H1A: β 1( populist ) ≠ β 1(nonpopulist)
Specifi cally, we expect the SES coeffi cient to be signifi cantly lower for populist 
country-years than for nonpopulist country-years. There are two ways to model 
such a relationship. The fi rst is multiple group analysis, which involves splitting 
the sample into populist, nonpopulist, and moderate-leftist country-years, then 
separately estimating the structural parameters for each sample. The second in-
volves specifi cation of a random slope. This requires the addition of the following 
to equation set:
(6) YPE i = β 0k + β 1k XSES + ui ,
(7) β 0k = γ00 + γ01XPopulistk + r0k , and
(8) β 1k = γ 10 + γ 11XPopulist + r1 k .
Substituting equations 7 and 8 into equation 6 leads to the following:
(9) YPEi = γ 00 + γ01XPopulistk + γ 10XSESi + γ 11(XPopulistk * XSESi ) + r0k + r1 k+ ui .
The random slope model suggests the following hypotheses to test whether the 
effect of SES varies depending on the presence or absence of populist leadership:
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H2 0: γ 11 = 0
H2 A: γ 11 ≠ 0
Where XPopulistk is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the kth country-year has a popu-
list leader and 0 if not. The extension of this equation for the three-group model 
is excluded for brevity. In our analysis we focus on the multiple group analysis as 
the most reliable. In addition to greater fl exibility, the relatively small number of 
country-years in our study gives the random-slope approach fairly low statistical 
power; we include such analyses primarily as a robustness check.
Finally, we include a full suite of control variables. Of these, the most impor-
tant is national-level inequality. Because left-wing populists may well be more 
likely to come to power in high-inequality societies (as confl ict theory would sug-
gest), leaving this variable out of analyses could lead to differences in the SES 
coeffi cient that would appear to be caused by populism but are in fact the product 
of higher inequality. We also include national income and a dummy variable for 
election years (either executive or parliamentary) at the country-year level. At the 
individual level we include gender, age, ideological self-placement and ideologi-
cal intensity, and a dummy for urban respondents.
Data
Individual-level data used in this article are from the 2006–2012 rounds of the 
LAPOP surveys. Countries included are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. We also 
used data from the 1998–2012 waves of LAPOP in Bolivia to provide an additional 
test of our theory by showing change within a country before and after the elec-
tion of a populist leader.
Measurement
Both of our most important variables, political engagement and SES, are ab-
stract and diffi cult to measure directly. We use confi rmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
techniques to account for this diffi culty. We assume that political engagement and 
SES are latent, unobservable variables, which affect our observed indicators (with 
some random error). Mathematically this can be expressed as follows:
(10) yi j = logit(λ jη + εi), and
(11) xi j = λ j ξ + δi ,
where yij is the i th observation of the j th indicator of the political engagement 
latent variable (η), x is the j th indicator of the latent SES variable (ξ ), and εi and δi 
are random measurement error terms. We use a logit link function for political 
engagement because its indicators are binary. We use a series of questions related 
to political behavior and attitudes as indicators of this latent concept—the clear 
implication being that individuals who engage in more forms of participation are, 
almost by defi nition, more engaged than those who participate in fewer; statistical 
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analysis in other contexts supports this (Rhodes-Purdy 2012). The items we use 
as indicators are attended a municipal council meeting, petitioned local offi cials, 
attended a political meeting, attended a protest, retrospective vote, prospective 
vote, and party ID. Data for party ID and prospective vote were not available in 
the earlier waves of the Bolivian studies, so the Bolivia-specifi c analysis does not 
include those as indicators for any year.
Socioeconomic status is measured by three indicators. We use income (stan-
dardized into deciles by country-year due to changes in question scale in the 2012 
wave), years of education, and a count of durable goods owned as indicators of 
the SES latent variable.3 The result is a continuous variable with zero mean. We 
use this variable in two ways in our analyses. First, we include the continuous 
measure, which assumes a linear relationship between SES and political engage-
ment. To account for potential nonlinearity, we also divide this variable into quin-
tiles, and include dummy variables for membership in the four lowest SES groups 
(leaving the fi fth as the reference category).
Simultaneous estimation of measurement and structural models, especially for 
models using random slopes, is prohibitively computationally intensive. There-
fore, we fi rst estimated the parameters of the CFA model listed earlier, using Stata 
version 13, and then used its postestimation predict function to get predicted fac-
tor scores for both political engagement and SES. In other words, we substitute 
ηˆ i and ξˆ i for YPolitical Engagementi and XSESi  , respectively, in equations 1–9. Results of the 
CFA are presented in table 2.
Income inequality across countries is measured by a Gini index of net income 
inequality (i.e., inequality after taxes and redistribution), taken from Solt’s Stan-
dardized World Inequality Database (SWID). Solt’s data set (version 5) has data 
for all country-years we use except several 2012 country-years, for which we sim-
ply use the 2011 data, and Nicaragua, where data is available only through 2009. 
We use the 2009 data for both 2010 and 2012 waves in Nicaragua. Solt’s data set 
includes one hundred imputations; therefore, we analyze the data through the 
standard procedure for handling multiple imputation data sets in Mplus ver-
sion 7. National income is measured as the log of per capita gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) in constant 2005 dollars.4
To classify our cases as populists, moderate leftists, and others, we rely on re-
cent literature on the subject (Hawkins 2009; Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter 2010; 
Lanzaro 2008; Castañeda and Morales 2008). Given the wave of leftist govern-
ments in the region, many scholars of Latin American politics have attempted to 
distinguish moderate leftists from populist leftists. Although they have different 
criteria, all these studies agree on the classifi cation of each case (when their cases 
coincide). Our only disagreement with the literature is that we classify Argentina 
as a case with a populist president. Cristina Fernández has revived the traditions 
of the Peronist movement. At the same time, she has developed policies and polit-
3. The goods are television, refrigerator, telephone (home and mobile), car, washing machine, micro-
wave, motorcycle, home drinking water, bathroom in the house, computer.
4. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, CEPALSTAT, “Estadísticas e indicado-
res,” http://estadisticas.cepal.org/cepalstat/WEB_CEPALSTAT/estadisticasIndicadores.asp?idioma=e.
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ical strategies based on strong redistributive claims. A list of country-years coded 
as moderate leftist and populist is presented in table 3. All other control variables 
(gender, age, urban, ideology) are measured by the relevant LAPOP questions. 
Ideological intensity is measured by squaring the ideology variable.
Estimation
The estimations for the regionwide regression models were conducted in 
MPLUS version 7, using maximum likelihood (ML) with missing values. This 
technique constructs the likelihood function observation by observation, using 
whatever information each observation contains (unless all independent variables 
are missing). This assumes missing at random (MAR), which is risky, as income 
and ideology are known to often be missing as a function of their values (not 
missing at random, or NMAR). NMAR models are extremely sensitive to viola-
Table 2 Estimation results, measurement models
Indicator Loading estimate (SE) p-value
Political engagement (n = 119,069)
 Attended municipal meeting 1.39
(.020)
.000
 Petitioned offi cial 1.00
(.016)
.000
 Attended political meeting 2.03
(.031)
.000
 Attended protest .936
(.017)
.000
 Retrospective vote .623
(.013)
.000
 Prospective vote 1.06
(.015)
.000
 Party ID 1.88
(.028)
.000
SES (n = 102,119)
 Income decile 1.96
(.010)
.000
 Education 2.86
(.015)
.000
 Goods owned .182
(.001)
.000
Goodness-of-fi t statistics a Statistic p-value
Chi-square b 4,919.0 .000
RMSEA .054 .000
CFI .911 —
a Goodness-of-fi t statistics not available for SES because model is exactly identifi ed.
b Signifi cant chi-square statistics usually indicate poor model fi t. However, given the sensitivity of this 
statistic to sample size and the large number of observations, this statistic is not a reliable indicator.
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tions of normality, and we feel that avoiding attempts to model these missingness 
functions is the safer choice (Allison 2012, 20). For the multiple group analyses, 
we use Wald tests to determine whether the coeffi cients for SES are signifi cantly 
different across populists and nonpopulists.
Analysis of Results
A brief restatement of the expectations of different theories is useful here. 
The three theories we have presented make clear predictions about relationships 
between inequality, SES, and engagement. These predictions are presented in 
table 4.
Our argument can be summarized as follows: We concur with resource theory 
regarding the role of access to mobilization resources in the relationship between 
SES, inequality, and engagement. However, our argument suggests an impor-
tant modifi cation to resource theory: the inability of the poor to pay the costs of 
 participation is not constant because political leaders can step in to help bear the 
burden, thus moderating the impact of SES on engagement. In other words, politi-
cal leaders who successfully mobilize the poor can push their societies toward dy-
namics closer to confl ict theory than to either resource or relative power theory.
We begin by presenting descriptive statistics in table 5. Specifi cally, we present 
the mean predicted factor scores for the engagement latent variable for the lowest 
and highest SES quintiles, by country and by populist and nonpopulist country-
years.
The difference between populist and nonpopulist country-years is consider-
able. The discrepancy in engagement between the poorest and the wealthiest in 
populist countries is much larger in nonpopulist countries. This immediately 
suggests that populism has some impact on how SES and political engagement 
relate, although such a simple comparison cannot provide strong evidence. Anal-
Table 3 List of leaders by type
Leader
Leadership 
type Country
Waves in 
power
Cristina Fernández Populist Argentina 2008–2012
Evo Morales Populist Bolivia 2006–2012
Rafael Correa Populist Ecuador 2008–2012
Daniel Ortega Populist Nicaragua 2008–2012
Hugo Chávez Populist Venezuela All
Lula da Silva Moderate leftist Brazil 2006–2010
Dilma Rousseff Moderate leftist Brazil 2012
Ricardo Lagos Moderate leftist Chile 2006
Michelle Bachelet Moderate leftist Chile 2006–2010
Fernando Lugo Moderate leftist Paraguay 2008–2012
Tabaré Vázquez Moderate leftist Uruguay 2006–2010
José Mujica Moderate leftist Uruguay 2012
Note: Years refer to the LAPOP wave, not actual years in power. Néstor Kirchner is excluded from anal-
ysis because Argentina was not included in the 2006 LAPOP wave, the last in which he was in power.
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yses of the multiple group model developed earlier provides far more convincing 
evidence; results are presented in tables 6 and 7.
Countries without populist leaders largely follow conventional social science 
expectations about the relationship between socioeconomic status and political 
engagement.5 As the results presented in tables 6 and 7 show, SES is positively 
associated with political engagement; the rich participate more than the poor to 
a signifi cant degree. However, our analysis introduces a signifi cant caveat. While 
the conventional treatment of the relationship between society and politics as 
unidirectional and invariant across contexts may be reasonable in developed 
societies, it is questionable in a context of developing societies such as those in 
Latin America. The stakes of politics are substantially higher in Latin America 
5. These countries are thus fairly compatible with Solt’s (2008) relative power framework as well as 
resource theory. The latter differs from relative power theory only in the extent to which the rich meet 
the disengagement of the poor with disengagement of their own or continued participation. Both imply 
a positive linear relationship; the former simply has a somewhat shallower slope than the latter.
Table 4 Summary of theoretical predictions
 
Relative 
power Confl ict Resource
SES coeffi cient Null Null Negative
Inequality Negative Positive Negative
Table 5 Descriptive statistics, mean engagement levels
  1st SES quintile 5th SES quintile Difference
Mexico −.001 .025 −.026
Guatemala −.169 −.094 −075
El Salvador −.096 .104 −.200
Honduras −.016 .175 −.191
Nicaragua .050 .214 −.164
Costa Rica −.195 .003 −.198
Panama −.132 −.028 −.104
Colombia −.077 .088 −.165
Ecuador −.168 −.009 −.159
Bolivia .091 .087 .004
Peru .011 −.057 .068
Paraguay −.044 .228 −.272
Chile −.252 −.214 −.038
Uruguay .090 .288 −.198
Brazil −.060 −.005 −.055
Venezuela −.027 .064 −.091
Argentina −.061 −.067 .006
Dominican Republic .543 .359 .175
Nonpopulists −.025 .051 −.076
Populists .020 .028 −.008
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Table 7 Multigroup comparison, SES categorical by quintiles
Populist (n = 26,883) Others (n = 67,224)
Political engagement (n = 94,107) Est. SE p-value Est. SE p-value
Individual level
SES, 1st quintile −.217 .040 .000 −.251 .010 .000
SES, 2nd quintile −.092 .026 .000 −.181 .010 .000
SES, 3rd quintile −.080 .032 .012 −.159 .012 .000
SES, 4th quintile −.043 .076 .576 −.109 .014 .000
Age .103 .007 .000 .127 .002 .000
Female −.126 .050 .013 −.120 .006 .000
Urban −.194 .082 .017 −.128 .006 .000
Ideology −.051 .008 .000 .004 .002 .024
Ideological intensity .184 .025 .000 .115 .002 .000
Country-year level
Inequality −.004 .617 .995 −.062 .043 .151
National income −.073 .492 .881 −.089 .049 .066
Election year −.045 .547 .935 .133 .091 .143
Intercept .301 .137 .028 .234 .066 .000
Individual disturbance variance .915 .015 .000 .902 .002 .000
Country-year disturbance variance .015 .065 .814 .046 .015 .001
SES coeffi cient difference Diff.
Wald 
test p-value
SES, 1st quintile .034 .697 .404
SES, 2nd quintile .089 10.2 .001
SES, 3rd quintile .079 5.41 .020
SES, 4th quintile .066 .743 .389
Intercept .067 .197 .657
than in the industrialized world, where the acceptable policy space is relatively 
well defi ned. Absolute inequality matters, but not as a variable. Rather, it is im-
portant because it creates a pool of alienation and resentment that can be tapped 
under the some circumstances. However, while this resource remains dormant, 
societies do tend to follow patterns of engagement in line with the conventional 
predictions; that is, the rich tend to participate more in politics.
Such dynamics, however, can change rather quickly. The potential for redis-
tributive confl ict, and the hesitance of traditional political elites to confront it, 
gives ambitious outsiders a ready resource to challenge the existing order. Highly 
unequal societies that experience mobilization political strategies tend to follow 
the dynamics predicted by confl ict theory. The slope of the engagement curve is 
signifi cantly shallower among populist country-years than among those without 
populist leaders. The results in table 7 are particularly clear. In substantive terms, 
this means that the relationship between SES and political engagement is consid-
erably weaker in countries with populist rulers. What is even more interesting is 
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the slope for moderate leftists, which is actually steeper than in either populist or 
non-redistributive country-years.
In table 6, the slope of SES is roughly 20 percent smaller in populist country-
years than in those without populists. In table 7, the impact of being in the second-
lowest SES quintile is twice as large in nonpopulist country-years as in popu-
list country-years. Table 6 also conforms to confl ict theory because all fi ve SES 
quintiles had higher predicted levels of support in populist countries, although 
differences were larger in the lower classes. Random slope models largely con-
fi rmed these analyses, although the difference for SES was not statistically signifi -
cant when treated as continuous (this was likely a result of low statistical power). 
These results of those analyses are presented in tables 8 and 9.
In simple terms, economic inequality predicts political inequality most di-
rectly in countries that are governed by the moderate left, then in countries gov-
erned by leaders who do not offer redistribution, or in populist countries. The 
difference is just short of statistical signifi cance (at the .05 level), but this fi nding 
is still interesting. The implication is that, when redistribution is offered without 
a mobilization political strategy, the poor actually withdraw from the political 
arena (perhaps content that their interests are being represented). Conversely, the 
rich, perhaps feeling threatened, increase their political activity in this scenario. 
Whatever the explanation, these analyses strongly support the importance of 
 political strategy for moderating the relationship between economic inequality 
and political attitudes.
A simple comparison of differences across country-years is highly suggestive, 
but attributing the effect directly to populist leadership is diffi cult; some factor 
that predicts both populism and a reshaping of the engagement curve could be 
Table 8 Random slope multilevel model, SES continuous
Political engagement (n = 94,107) Est. SE p-value
Individual level
SES .093 .014 .000
Age .122 .002 .000
Female −.122 .004 .000
Urban −.161 .005 .000
Ideology −.013 .002 .000
Ideological intensity .135 .002 .000
Country-year level
Populist −.063 .102 .537
Populist × SES −.027 .025 .279
Inequality −.061 .041 .132
National income −.110 .039 .005
Election year .095 .068 .163
Intercept .161 .047 .004
Individual disturbance variance .903 .001 .000
Country-year disturbance variance .039 .008 .000
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driving the results. The most likely suspect is national-level inequality, for which 
we control, but there could well be others. To address this, we also conducted 
an analysis of one country, Bolivia, for which data are available for several years 
before and after the rise of Evo Morales. This model has identical measures to 
those presented earlier except for two indicators of engagement that were not 
available. Additionally, we drop country-level predictors and use a simple fi xed-
effects model, where the idiosyncratic effects of such predictors are controlled for 
via the year-level residuals. Results from these analyses are presented in tables 10 
and 11.
These results conform to those presented earlier. The coeffi cient of SES was 
reduced by three-fi fths after Morales took power. The reduction in the negative 
impact of membership in the fi rst SES quintile was a similar magnitude, while 
that of second quintile membership was reduced by three-fourths (both differ-
ences were statistically signifi cant). Short of a true experiment, this is perhaps 
the closest one can get to a direct test the way populism shapes the engagement 
curve. And, as in our cross-sectional analyses, the impact is clear: countries 
with populist presidents adhere more to confl ict theory than to either of Solt’s 
alternatives.
Table 9 Random slope multilevel model, SES categorical by quintiles
Political engagement (n = 94,107) Est. SE p-value
Individual level
SES, 1st quintile −.262 .035 .000
SES, 2nd quintile −.189 .023 .000
SES, 3rd quintile −.162 .018 .000
SES, 4th quintile −.111 .014 .000
Age .121 .002 .000
Female −.123 .005 .000
Urban −.153 .005 .000
Ideology −.013 .002 .000
Ideological intensity .135 .002 .000
Country-year level
Populist −.144 .108 .182
Populist × SES, 1st quintile .061 .072 .396
Populist × SES, 2nd quintile .103 .053 .052
Populist × SES, 3rd quintile .085 .034 .011
Populist × SES, 4th quintile .069 .027 .011
Inequality −.066 .039 .093
National income −.118 .041 .004
Election year .091 .074 .218
Intercept .301 .046 .004
Individual disturbance variance .904 .002 .000
Country-year disturbance variance .035 .010 .000
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Table 10 Bolivia before and after Morales comparison, SES continuous
Political engagement 
(n = 24,645)
Before Morales (n = 15,452) After Morales (n = 9,193)
Est. SE p-value Est. SE p-value
Individual level
SES .080 .009 .000 .030 .010 .004
Age .153 .018 .000 .138 .010 .000
Female −.284 .016 .000 −.176 .021 .000
Urban −.374 .018 .000 −.013 .012 .308
Ideology −.099 .013 .000 −.140 .018 .000
Ideological intensity .243 .030 .000 .270 .039 .000
Intercept .909 .126 .000 .830 .111 .000
Individual-level disturbance 
variance
.927 .011 .000 .954 .014 .000
Year-level disturbance 
variance
.063 .037 .093 .012 .009 .176
SES coeffi cient difference Diff. Wald test p-value
Before/after Morales .050 13.61 .000
Table 11 Bolivia before and after Morales comparison, SES categorical by quintile
Political engagement 
(n = 24,645)
Before Morales (n = 15,452) After Morales (n = 9,193)
Est. SE p-value Est. SE p-value
Individual level
SES, 1st quintile −.227 .028 .000 −.107 .034 .002
SES, 2nd quintile −.128 .026 .000 −.039 .032 .217
SES, 3rd quintile −.083 .025 .001 −.015 .030 .618
SES, 4th quintile −.025 .025 .316 −.014 .030 .641
Age .156 .018 .000 .140 .010 .000
Female −.284 .016 .000 −.174 .021 .000
Urban −.372 .018 .000 −.013 .012 .292
Ideology −.220 .030 .000 −.300 .039 .000
Ideological intensity .240 .030 .000 .272 .039 .000
Intercept .465 .106 .000 .123 .060 .040
Individual-level disturbance 
variance
.927 .011 .000 .954 .014 .000
Year-level disturbance 
variance
.064 .038 .093 .012 .009 .176
Before/after Morales
SES coeffi cient difference Diff. Wald test p-value
SES, 1st quintile −.120 7.39 .007
SES, 2nd quintile −.089 4.67 .031
SES, 3rd quintile −.068 3.09 .079
SES, 4th quintile −.011 .075 .784
Intercept .342 7.87 .005
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CONCLUSIONS
This article has shown the effects of political strategies in shaping the con-
nection between inequality and political engagement. Latin America provides a 
unique opportunity to study this relationship because it introduces an empirical 
and a theoretical puzzle. Absolute inequality is relatively constant and pervasive 
across countries but shows enormous variation in terms of engagement. The fact 
that the key independent variable does not vary while outcomes do makes Latin 
America uniquely suited for opening the black box of how structural conditions 
interact with political offers to shape patterns of political activism. Moreover, by 
cracking open the black box, we realize that this relationship is highly contingent 
on the choices of political agents. This contingency allows us to explain the pres-
ence of greater engagement among the poor, counter to the predictions of the rela-
tive power theory of generally depressed involvement across social strata, found 
by Solt (2008), given constant high inequality.
Our analysis implies the need for a more nuanced understanding of the effects 
of populism in Latin America vis-à-vis democratic quality. While we do not in-
clude any explanation of when and where populists succeed in our theory, we can 
speculate a bit in light of our conclusions. Concerns over populism’s disregard for 
liberal norms of political competition have often obscured the contribution that 
some populist movements make to bringing formerly excluded sectors of soci-
ety into the political arena. Developing democracies face the following dilemma: 
democracy there is either boring (i.e., the policy space is tightly constrained to 
similar and moderate alternatives) and stable or intense and unstable (Rosen-
blatt 2013). Populism is not an accident of history but a reaction to the failure of 
more “responsible” or “traditional” political actors to open the democratic arena 
to all sectors of society (Rhodes-Purdy 2015). No matter how much moderate left-
ists may be committed to ameliorating inequality, if they fail to generate actual 
signifi cant changes, they lack the political backing to survive crises; this fl aw is 
of their own making, as they specifi cally avoid building strong mobilized bases 
(with a few notable exceptions). When considered in tandem with our analyses 
of the way moderate leftist leaders affect the engagement curve, this dynamic 
becomes quite troubling, because such movements are inherently unsustainable. 
Venezuela under Punto Fijo is a good historical example. Decades of successive 
Acción Democrática administrations engaged in redistribution. However, when 
crisis struck in the 1980s and 1990s, the traditional Venezuelan left was eventu-
ally felled by its elitist image, supplanted by a movement that offered the poor a 
chance not merely to have a larger slice of the national treasure but also win those 
gains for themselves through political participation.
In other words, populist leaders, while certainly capable of destabilizing soci-
eties with their combative style and Manichaean rhetoric, can also force societies 
to confront problems that often have festered for generations. Although in the 
immediate term this may mean heightened confl ict and concomitant instability 
(and a potential depression of democratic quality), it may also help to begin tear-
ing down structural inequality.
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